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Abstract 
Rail transport plays an important role in creating a sustainable future for transport. Safety can be defined as 
qualitatively or quantitatively to prevent unacceptable risks. Improving safety is the main goal of each railway 
company as safe operation helps in increasing the level of service offered to the users. This paper deals with 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of accidents in Egyptian National Railway for annual accidents during the 
period of 2011 till 2017 for the six zones classified according to causes as absolute values and relative values to 
determine the worst zones and the most popular causes to improve the safety level and put the corrective plan to 
minimize the effective of accidents on both economic and safety of the society, to realize this goal a data 
collections were obtained and traffic fluction were calculated by the use of the official time table in 
train.km/year for the six zones. The study proposes effective solution for the decision maker to enface this very 
dangerous problem and improve the economic efficiency of the system, and preserve the environment 
surrounding the system. 
Keywords: Egyptian National Railway(ENR); Safety; Risk; Quantitative; Qualitative; Accident; Derailment; 
Collision; Level crossing and Fire.  
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1. Introduction  
Rail transport plays an important role in creating a sustainable future for transport. Safety can be defined as 
preventing unacceptable risks. Improving safety is the main goal of each railway company as safe operation 
helps in increasing the level of service offered to the users, improving the economic efficiency of the system, 
and preserving the environment surrounding the system. A significant rail accident is any undesired or 
unexpected incidents involving at least one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously 
injured person or in significant damage for the railway system (railway infrastructure, rolling stock, and railway 
operation) and the environment [1]. According to Egyptian National Railway, the total number of railway 
accidents in Egypt from 2011 until 2017 was 6,843 that is high number of accidents, and the latest four years 
from 2014 to 2017 there have been more than 1,000 accidents yearly, specially in 2017 which have the largest 
number of accidents, figure (1) illustrate the rate of accidents during the seven years & % of it.  
 
Figure 1: Number of annual total accidents in Egypt during the years 2011 till 2017and %of it. 
The approach taken in this research is to conduct detailed analysis of the train accident data supplied by the 
railways authority; Analysis of the causes of train accidents helps to put the correction plans to reduce accident 
occurrence in the most cost-effective manner possible. 
2. Definition 
Safety of a railway system can be defined qualitatively or quantitatively [2]: 
2.1. A qualitative assessment approach of safety is risk level 
2.1.1. The correlation between the frequency and the severity of an event defines four risk levels [2] 
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2.1.1.1. Non-permissible 
Accidents of this category must be eliminated.  
It represents the most significant category and necessitates urgent safety measures by the services responsible, 
regardless of the financial and operational cost. 
2.1.1.2. Non-desirable 
Accidents of this category can be accepted only in case of inability to contain their consequences and always 
upon the relevant approval of the authority in charge. 
2.1.1.3. Permissible 
It corresponds to a generally acceptable safety level, without excluding further improvements, if it is feasible. 
2.1.1.4. Unimportant 
The incidents of this category are acceptable, provided that there is approval of the competent authority. 
Table 1:  Shows risk levels as the combination of frequency and severity frequency and severity of accidents 
 Risk levels 
Accident severity 
Catastrophic Severe Minor importance Negligible 
A
cc
id
en
t f
re
qu
en
cy
 
Frequent Non-permissible Non-permissible Non-permissible Non-desirable 
Possible Non-permissible Non-permissible Non-desirable Permissible 
Occasional Non-permissible Non-desirable Non-desirable Permissible 
Unusual Non-desirable Non-desirable Permissible Unimportant 
Rare Permissible Permissible Unimportant Unimportant 
Unlikely Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant 
 
Source: Adapted from European Standard EN50126-1 2000, Railway Applications: Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety (RAMS), Part 1, CENELEC European Standards (European Committee for 
Electromechanical Standardization). 
 
2.1.2. Regarding the classification of accidents according to the severity of their consequences, the following 
definitions are suggested 
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2.1.2.1. Catastrophic 
Fatalities and/or multiple severe injuries and/or severe environmental impact and/or extensive property damage. 
2.1.2.2. Severe 
One fatality and/or serious injury, and/or significant environmental impact, and/or limited severe property 
damage. 
2.1.2.3. Low severity 
Minor injury, and/or significant threat (or low impact) on the environment, and/or limited damage. 
 2.1.2.4. Negligible 
Possible minor injury and/or minor property damage. 
2.2. A quantitative assessment of safety is accident indicators. Countries use specific indicators related to 
accidents (per year) to evaluate their railway networks’ safety [2&6] 
1. Total number of serious accidents (number). 
2. Relative number of serious accidents (number/train-kilometer). 
3. Distribution of accidents per accident category. 
4. Fatality risk indicator: death toll as a result of train accidents per million train-kilometers. 
2.3. The railway accidents can be classified into five main categories 
2.3.1. Collisions 
It includes head-on collision, rear collision and side collision. It also includes accidents at Level Crossings.  
2.3.2. Derailments 
This refers to the offloading of wheel or wheels from the track causing detention or damage to rolling stock / 
permanent way. It includes Derailment on the main track and Derailment on sidings. 
2.3.3. Fire in Trains 
Accident related to fumes, fires of vehicles, tractors or cables in trains. 
2.3.4. Opponents on lines 
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The incidents of opposition to the lines are accidents caused by external factors that affect the rail, such as the 
fluctuation of the atmosphere resulting in the occurrence of a tree or cable electricity on the track or leave things 
on the track. 
2.3.5. Other Train Accidents 
2.3.5.1. Signal abuse 
It is an accident that exceeds the semaphores and the disks when the signal is red, even though it is red. 
2.3.5.2. Traffic abuse 
It is an accident that violates the work of railway passengers, which mean entering the train in a busy railway 
that is supposed to be empty. 
2.3.5.3. Platform abuse 
Is the occurrence of accidents exceeding the trains to the platforms of the stations, that is, the driver exceeds the 
Green Semaphore and away by the door of the vehicle from the platform of the station so that passengers can 
get off at the station . 
2.3.5.4. Turnouts abuse 
When crossing the turnouts; it is closed or open in another direction or needs maintenance. 
2.3.5.5. Train separation 
These are incidents of separation of the train cars from each other or the separation of the tractor from the 
vehicles 
2.3.5.6. Door opening 
Is the opening of the doors of the train, such as the opening of the doors of freight trains during the transfer of 
army vehicles and the transfer of guns over vehicles.  
3. Methodology 
Railway safety is a result of concerted dynamic and daily effort of all relevant actors who interact in the railway 
system.  
The figure 2 summaries proposed methodology for the safety analyses for railway. 
3.1. First step 
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Define current situation (rate, location, types of accidents, and causes of accidents). 
3.1.1 ENR network divided into six zones  
(Central zone, Middle delta zone, West delta zone, East delta zone, Middle zone, Southern zone). 
3.1.2. Types of railway accidents 
ENR accidents divided into five types:  
1- Collisions (at level crossing - at illegal level crossing - gate collision - train collision – by fraction). 
2- Derailments (on main lines - on branch lines - on refuge and yards). 
3- Fire in Trains. 
4- Opponents on lines. 
5- Other Train Accidents (Signal abuse - Traffic abuse - Platform abuse - Turnout’s abuse - Train 
separation - Door opening). 
 
 
Figure 2: Represents flow chart of  proposed methodolgy. 
Case study:  By applying this previous methodolgy on ENR. 
3.1.3. Causes of railway accidents 
Causes of railway accidents may be identified as follows: 
3.1. First step: Define current situation (rate, location, and type 
of accidents). 
 
3.2. Second step: Analyze the collected data. 
 
3.3. Third step: Develop correction plans. 
 
3.4. Fourth step: implement the plans. 
  
 
 3.5. Fifth step: Evaluate the effectiveness of the plans on safety. 
 
 
 
American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No  1, pp 61-75 
67 
 
• Defects in level crossings, (broken barriers, defect in the train announcement system, insufficient/lack 
of road signs, insufficient lighting). 
• False switching, and don’t fix the turnout in its correct location. 
• Violation of instruction (Violation of/incorrect application of the regulations by the staff). 
• Collision with buses, cars, trucks, motorcycle. 
• Defects in the equipment of train control. 
• Defective signals on semaphores or disks, or false information to the train driver. 
• Inadequate maintenance of the track, which may lead to derailment. 
• Mechanical failures of wheels and rails like that (rail erosion, rail cracks, rail defects, track geometry 
defects, sleeper cracks, error in the track alignment geometry (insufficient cant, insufficient length of 
transition curves, etc.). 
• External factors like that (Earthquake while the train is moving, explosion on railway, Occupation of 
the track (by strikes, sand, rubbish, Pedestrian/animal drifts on track, waters/flooding of the facilities), 
vandalism, sabotage, terrorist actions, falling rocks, etc.).  
• Collapsed bridge by structural failure. 
• Improper loading or unloading of cargo. 
• Technical failures in the railway infrastructure and/or in the rolling stock. 
• Human errors like that (braking during moving the train, Speed not organized by train driver). 
• Train staff which is either untrained or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. [1&3]. 
 
3.2. Second step: Analyze the collected data 
Figurs 3,4,5,6 and tables 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 showes the distribution of the no.of accidents on the six zones . 
Table 2:  Represents the Total no. of accidentes &%of Total no. of accidentes from 2011 to 2017  for all types 
of accidentes . 
Types of accidents 
Total no. of acc.  from 2011 to 2017 %of Total no. of acc. from 2011 to 2017 
Absolute Relative absolute Relative 
Derailment 483 12.94 7 8 
Total collision 5152 127.24 76 75 
Fire in trains 161 4.2 2 3 
Opponents on lines 536 14.21 8 8 
Other train accidents 432 10.64 7 8 
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Figure 3&4: Absolute number of annual accidents on ENR networks during the years 2011 till 2017 for the sex 
railway zones in absolute accidents and in relative accidents per 1000 train.km. 
 
 
Figure 5&6:  Persantage share of  total  accidentes on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017` for each 
zones the sex Railway zones in abslute ccidentes and in relative accidente per 1000 train.km . 
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Figure 5&6: Total no. of acc. due to types of accidents & %of it on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 
2017 in abslute accidentes and in relative accidente per 1000 train.km . 
 
Table 3:  Persantage of share of  accidentes for each zone on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017 
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Table 4: The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual derailment 
accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. 
Zone 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Central 
Zone 
Middle 
Delta Zone 
West Delta 
Zone 
East Delta 
Zone 
Middle 
Zone 
Southern 
Zone Total & % of it 
ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 
2011 7 0.19 6 0.11 2 0.06 8 0.28 4 0.08 2 0.08 29 6 0.80 6 
2012 20 0.54 4 0.08 5 0.14 6 0.21 8 0.16 1 0.04 44 9 1.17 9 
2013 32 0.86 7 0.13 9 0.26 10 0.35 11 0.22 0 0.00 69 14 1.82 14 
2014 14 0.38 11 0.21 4 0.11 6 0.21 6 0.12 1 0.04 42 9 1.07 8 
2015 33 0.89 18 0.34 31 0.88 16 0.56 10 0.20 6 0.25 114 24 3.12 24 
2016 37 1.00 21 0.40 25 0.71 9 0.31 15 0.30 4 0.17 111 23 2.89 23 
2017 21 0.57 13 0.25 15 0.43 17 0.59 5 0.10 3 0.12 74 15 2.06 16 
Table 5: The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual total collision 
accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. 
Zone 
  
 
 
 
Year 
Central 
Zone 
Middle 
Delta Zone 
West 
Delta 
Zone 
East Delta 
Zone 
Middle 
Zone 
Southern 
Zone Total & % of it 
ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 
2011 31 0.84 36 0.69 28 0.80 19 0.66 21 0.42 11 0.46 146 3 3.86 3 
2012 68 1.83 70 1.34 40 1.14 23 0.80 58 1.16 21 0.87 280 5 7.15 5 
2013 85 2.29 151 2.89 41 1.17 73 2.54 160 3.19 37 1.54 547 11 13.62 11 
2014 129 3.48 205 3.92 46 1.31 110 3.83 243 4.85 96 3.99 829 16 21.38 17 
2015 191 5.15 183 3.50 57 1.62 129 4.49 234 4.67 89 3.70 883 17 23.14 18 
2016 212 5.72 266 5.09 64 1.82 108 3.76 224 4.47 47 1.96 921 18 22.82 18 
2017 168 4.53 841 16.09 83 2.37 94 3.27 275 5.49 85 3.54 1546 30 35.28 28 
Table 6:  The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual fire in trains 
accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. 
Zone 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Central 
Zone 
Middle 
Delta Zone 
West Delta 
Zone 
East Delta 
Zone 
Middle 
Zone 
Southern 
Zone Total & % of it 
ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.03 1 0.02 0 0 2 1 0.055 1 
2012 2 0.05 0 0 1 0.03 1 0.03 2 0.04 1 0.042 7 4 0.199 5 
2013 1 0.03 1 0.02 3 0.09 1 0.03 1 0.02 0 0 7 4 0.186 5 
2014 7 0.19 8 0.15 4 0.11 2 0.07 4 0.08 0 0 25 16 0.605 14 
2015 9 0.24 7 0.13 7 0.2 6 0.21 8 0.16 5 0.208 42 26 1.153 27 
2016 13 0.35 6 0.11 1 0.03 4 0.14 6 0.12 2 0.083 32 20 0.836 20 
2017 10 0.27 3 0.06 7 0.2 1 0.03 20 0.4 5 0.208 46 29 1.169 28 
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Table 7:  The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual opponents on 
lines accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. 
Zone 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Central 
Zone 
Middle 
Delta Zone 
West Delta 
Zone 
East Delta 
Zone 
Middle 
Zone 
Southern 
Zone Total &%of it 
ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 
2011 22 0.59 16 0.31 12 0.34 6 0.21 24 0.48 9 0.374 89 17 2.303 16 
2012 13 0.35 3 0.06 11 0.31 7 0.24 13 0.26 4 0.166 51 10 1.391 10 
2013 14 0.38 23 0.44 13 0.37 8 0.28 22 0.44 4 0.166 84 16 2.072 15 
2014 28 0.76 16 0.31 6 0.17 18 0.63 18 0.36 12 0.499 98 18 2.717 19 
2015 29 0.78 14 0.27 9 0.26 20 0.7 21 0.42 6 0.249 99 18 2.671 19 
2016 9 0.24 10 0.19 13 0.37 6 0.21 16 0.32 7 0.291 61 11 1.624 11 
2017 11 0.3 7 0.13 9 0.26 2 0.07 17 0.34 8 0.332 54 10 1.429 10 
Table 8:  The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual other train 
accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. 
Zone 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Central 
Zone 
Middle 
Delta Zone 
West Delta 
Zone 
East Delta 
Zone 
Middle 
Zone 
Southern 
Zone Total & % of it 
ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 
2011 12 0.32 13 0.25 5 0.14 3 0.1 26 0.52 2 0.08 61 14 1.421 14 
2012 13 0.35 10 0.19 12 0.34 4 0.14 23 0.46 3 0.12 65 15 1.607 15 
2013 15 0.41 13 0.25 11 0.31 7 0.24 21 0.42 0 0 67 16 1.63 15 
2014 10 0.27 11 0.21 8 0.23 3 0.1 12 0.24 4 0.17 48 11 1.219 12 
2015 22 0.59 15 0.29 9 0.26 2 0.07 15 0.30 3 0.12 66 15 1.631 15 
2016 18 0.49 12 0.23 13 0.37 2 0.07 23 0.46 3 0.12 71 16 1.739 16 
2017 9 0.24 15 0.29 12 0.34 5 0.17 9 0.18 4 0.17 54 13 1.392 13 
Table 9: The largest (zone in (absolute & relative) no. of accidents & the largest year & %of total no.(absolute 
& relative)) in all types of accidents. 
Types of accidents 
Zone  
Year 
%of total no. of 
accidents  
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 
Derailment central zone central zone 2015 24% 24% 
Total collision middle delta zone central zone 2017 30%  28% 
Fire in trains central zone central zone 2017 29%  28% 
Opponents on 
lines central zone central zone 2014&2015 18%  19% 
Other train 
accidents Middle Zone 
central zone& 
Middle Zone 2016 16% 16% 
Note: Analyze the accidents in Egypt on years and the same situation till now without taking safty improvement 
, this equations above in table 10 shows the relationship between  absolute and  relative no. of accidents at 
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Zones in Egypt within 2011 till 2017 and shows equation for curves and correlation numbers for them related to 
polynomial curves , we try to solve this problem and reduse no. of accidents on the next years . 
Table 10: Absolute Total no. of accidents and  relative Total no. of acc./1000train.Km on Zones in Egypt within 
2011 till 2017 and shows equation for curves and correlation numbers for them related to polynomial curves. 
Zone Central  Zone 
Middle Delta 
Zone 
West Delta 
Zone 
East Delta 
Zone 
Middle 
Zone 
Southern 
Zone 
R² 0.8398  0.8425 0.8955 0.8394 0.9484 0.6564 
Equ. for 
no. of  
acc. 
y = -7.119x2 + 
28709x - 
3E+07 
y = 29.202x2 - 
117522x + 
1E+08 
y = 0.3571x2 - 
1424.7x + 
1E+06 
y = -7.1905x2 
+ 28982x - 
3E+07 
y = -
7.619x2 + 
30733x - 
3E+07 
y = -
2.9643x2 
+ 11954x 
- 1E+07 
Equ. for 
no. of 
acc./100
0train.k
m 
y = -0.1921x2 
+ 774.65x – 
780989 
y = 0.5585x2 - 
2247.8x + 
2E+06 
y = 0.0102x2 - 
40.61x + 40499 
y = -0.2501x2 
+ 1008.2x - 
1E+06 
y = -
0.1521x2 + 
613.4x – 
618551 
y = -
0.1233x2 
+ 
497.27x – 
501341 
Table 11: The risk permissible level in all types of accidents to evaluate it from risk level of each type of 
accidents according to table 1 & this equation In Egypt within 2011 till 2017  . 
 
Types of accidents 
Total no. of 
accidents from 
2011 to 2017 
Classification of risks 
Risk permissible level Accident 
frequent 
Accident 
severity Risk level 
Derailment 483 4 4 16 Non-permissible 
Total collision 5152 5 4 20 Non-permissible 
Fire in trains 161 2 3 6 Permissible 
Opponents on lines 336 3 3 9 Non-desirable 
Other train accidents 432 3 3 9 Non-desirable 
 
Risk level = Accident frequent* Accident severity (R=F*S) [4] 
3.3. Third step: Develop correction plans 
(as well shown in the conclossion). 
3.4. Fourth step: implement the plans 
(as recommendation). 
3.5. Fifth step: Evaluate the effectiveness of the plans on safety 
 (as recommendation). 
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4. Results 
• From figure3&4 we observe that the largest  zone in total no. of accidents is middle zone & the largest  
zone in total no. of accidents/1000train.km is central zone within 2011 till 2017 but middle delta zone 
in 2017 has large increasing in absolute and relative no. of accidents because of increasing of gate 
collision in this zone . 
• From  figure5&6  we observe that the largest  zone in total no. of accidents is middle delta  zone with 
persentage of 30%  & the largest  zone in total no. of accidents/1000train.km is middle delta  zone with 
persentage of 23%   within 2011 till 2017. 
• From table 2 & two figures6&7 we observe that the largest total no. of accidentes (absolute&Relative) 
at total collision with persentage 76% of the total no. of accidentes this represents more than half of  
total no. of accidentes from 2011 to 2017 because of large no. of  accidents at level crossing specially 
at gate collision with cars . 
• From table3 we observe that the largest no. of % of share of  accidentes(absolute&relative) at 2011 is 
(23% in middle zone &23% in central zone) ,  at 2012 is (26%&27) in central zone , at 2013 is 
(28%&22%) in middle zone ,  at 2014 is (27%&21%) in middle zone ,  at 2015 is (24% in middle 
zone&24% in central zone) ,  at 2016 is (26% in middle delta zone&26% in central zone) ,  at 2017 is 
(20%&40%) in middle delta zone ,  Total absolute (2011 till 2017) is 30% in middle delta zone and  
Total relative (2011 till 2017) is 23% in middle delta zone . 
• From table4 we observe that the largest zone in.(absolute & relative) no. of accidents is central zone at 
the most of zones & the largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of derailment is 24%  in 
2015 . 
• From table5 we observe that the largest zone in absolute no. of accidents is middle delta zone at the 
most of zones & the largest zone in relative no. of accidents is central zone at the most of zones & the 
largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of total collision is (30% & 28%) in 2017 . 
• From table6 we observe that the largest zone in .(absolute & relative)  no. of accidents is central zone at 
the most of zones & the largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of fire in trains is (29% & 
28%) in 2017 . 
• From table7 we observe that the largest zone in .(absolute & relative)  no. of accidents is central zone at 
the most of zones & the largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of Opposials on lines is 
(18% & 19%) in 2014&2015 . 
• From table8 we observe that the largest zone in (absolute & relative)  no. of accidents is Middle Zone 
at the most of zones & the largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of Opposials on lines is 
(16%) in 2016 . 
• From table9 we observe that central zone is the largest no. of accidents in the most of types of 
accidents. 
• From table10 we observe that the largest correlation no. is 0.9484 in middle zone and the lowest no. is 
0.6564 in southern zone.   
• From table11 we observe that the largest risk level is 20 in total collision which have non-permissible 
risk level then derailment is 16 which have non-permissible risk level too. 
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
• This analysis applied to all accidents on the six zones in Egypt from 2011 to 2017 to see which of them 
needs to be developed priority to reduce no. of accidents in it. 
• We observe that central zone is the largest no. of accidents in the most of types of accidents. 
• The largest total no. of accidents (absolute & relative) at total collision with percentage 76% of the 
total no. of accidents this represents more than half of total no. of accidents from 2011 to 2017 because 
of large no. of accidents at level crossing specially at gate collision with cars. 
• The largest risk level is 20 in total collision which have non-permissible risk level then derailment is 16 
which have non-permissible risk level too. 
      Correctin actions for maintanance:  
• Closing of illegal level crossing on railway lines. 
• Making reminder courses for workers in maintenance on lines. 
• Distributing of workers in maintenance sites according to priority work and size. 
• Examining the turnouts of stations and ensure the integrity of their tasks and change the damaged ones. 
•  Following-up the maintenance of the daily and periodic railways of welded and non-welded railways 
as well as diversions and level crossings in accordance with technical regulations to ensure the safety 
of the train tracks at the limited speeds. 
• Paying attention to quality system in all works to rationalize the expenses and ensure that the 
implementation is not repeated again. 
• Install the appropriate protection systems in level crossings. 
• Detecting welds and securing defective welds. 
• Put up warning signs, regulatory and the ground planning for vehicles movement when approaching 
the legal or illegal level crossing area. 
• Install monitoring systems which identify any defective material or operation. 
•  For separated railways, ensure the maximum level of cooperation between infrastructure and 
operation. 
Correctin actions for human power: 
• Train drivers must comply with the speed limits for maneuvering and during heating (8 km /h). 
• The drivers of the trains, locomotives or moving units should not exceed any of the semaphore or disks, 
which will only show the danger signal in the authorized cases and provided that the driver receives the 
appropriate movement order as the case may be. 
• Ensure that employees are aware of the critical functions of safety instructions and the seriousness of 
their training programs. 
• Improve the working environment for the train workers. 
• Improve the education of all railway staff. 
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      Correctin actions for safety regulations: 
• Increasing the number of A.T.C control devices for trains with blocks and towers and activating their 
work. 
• Determine the technical authorities who responsible for the accidents with the Railway Authority. 
• Improve operational safety systems, such as the automatic train control system. 
• Inform the clients and more generally the public on the dangers related to the railway system (though 
smaller compared to other transport modes). 
• Implement the correction plane and reevaluate safety.   
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